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Introduction
Does the freer movement of goods, people, ideas and money across national
boundaries mean that, as Charles Kindleberger (1969):207 put it, "the nation state is just
about through as an economic unit" when it comes to the provision of social insurance
and programs of egalitarian redistribution? Surely globalization will not eliminate the
conditions economic insecurity and distributions of income widely thought to be unfair
that initially gave rise to the welfare state. What form will responses to these
conditions take in a globally integrated economy?
The thesis we will advance is this.1 Globalization is an extension of nationalism
(not its antithesis) with regard to some aspects of culture and economic structure: it
promotes cultural standardization and economic integration across national boundaries.
But unlike nationalism, globalization does this without providing either the international
cultural solidarity or governmental institutions capable of supporting egalitarian
redistribution and insurance on a global scale, while weakening the nation-based
institutions for the same. In this respect a globalized world may recreate the social
structure of the archetypal agrarian empire: a dominant English-speaking class of
cosmopolitans presiding over a heterogeneous and provincial underclass speaking a
Babel of dialects, with little solidarity across the language groups and weak nationallybased instruments of social insurance and egalitarian redistribution.
The politics of social insurance may thus increasingly pit the cosmopolitans
against the provincials (not capital against labor, or even the high earners against the low
earners, as many of the cosmopolitans are far from rich.) The result need not be
institutional convergence to a world of uniformly minimalist welfare states, however,
for the process of specialization induced by greater integration may support distinct
institutional arrangements appropriate to each economy’s divergent product mixes.
Countries specializing in goods characterized by volatile demand or requiring high
levels of specific skills may be induced by globalization to strengthen their systems of
1
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social protection.
It is likely, however, that in many countries the reverse will occur. In these
economies, social insurance will be compromised, leaving the provincials increasingly
vulnerable to industry- or occupation-specific shocks. Where this occurs, risk reduction
may take the form of foregoing specialization in occupation- or industry-specific skills,
and maintaining a relatively unspecialized national "portfolio" of sectors and
occupations to which one may move if one’s own source of livelihood is threatened.
In this case, optimal integration into the global order requires balancing the
marginal gains in expected income associated with greater specialization (the gains from
trade) against the marginal losses associated with the enhanced risks occasioned by
specialization. This optimum will not be achieved by private decision-making, because
the availability of a diverse portfolio of sectors and occupations has a public good aspect.
We advance this thesis not as the confirmed result of a coherent model
adequately tested empirically, but rather as a research agenda that is not inconsistent with
what is known, and worth pursuing in light of the importance of the issues it addresses.
Globalization: the Highest Stage of Nationalism?
Globalization is typically represented by economists as the process of integration
of national economies brought about by the reduction in costs of transportation and
communication and the removal of impediments to the movement of goods, people and
finance across national borders. But the same processes that have fostered the freer
movement of goods, people, and finance are also creating a global culture, that is a
common language and system of meanings among people in many nations.
Ernest Gellner (1983) defined nationalism as a movement seeking congruence
between the ethnic community and the political community: "one national state, one
national culture!" has been its political motto.2 Because we are going to claim that
globalism is an extension of Gellner’s nationalism, we will consider his interpretation
in some detail:
...nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic
boundaries should not cut across political ones and in particular that
ethnic boundaries withing a given state...should not separate the power
holders from the rest. (Gellner (1983):1)
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His later works (Gellner (1998;(1999)) recognized the continuity between
nationalism and globalism. See also Pagano, U. (2003)
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The standardization of language and culture within a nation that nationalism sought and
largely accomplished is what made it so radical during its early years, especially by
comparison with the structure of the agrarian empires and other agrarian societies that
it replaced.
The technological stagnation of agrarian society allowed the endless repetition
of the same production process; individuals could perpetuate the same jobs based on the
same skills from one generation to the next. Cultural diversity among all except the elite
stabilized these roles. It limited both horizontal and vertical mobility and allowed the
endless reproduction of the social fabric over time. Cultural diversity -- both between
the elite and the rest, and among the rest -- was both a condition for and a result of
societal inertia. It supported the stagnation of society by depriving most of its members
of the incentives to seek social mobility. At the same time cultural diversity along both
its horizontal and vertical dimensions favored by the unchanging structure of society.
The rudimentary and geographically confined division of labor in these societies
was such that ordinary farmers and craftsmen in one locality had little need to
communicate with their counterparts in other locales. Other than the payment of taxes
or the transfer of a share of their crops, they had even less need to interact with
members of the elite.
But the broadening scope of goods markets and eventually the emergence of
labor markets and other capitalist economic institutions radically altered the cultural
requirements of economic life. Again, Gellner:
For the first time in human history, explicit and reasonably precise
communication becomes generally, pervasively used and important. In
the closed local communities of the agrarian or tribal worlds, when it
came to communication, context tone, gesture, personality and situation
were everything (33)
Communication “by means of written, impersonal, context-free to-whom-it-may-concern
type messages” required what Gellner termed “exo-education”, that is, childhood socialization by specialists who are not members of one's family or group of close associates.
Paradoxically, he wrote,
...industrial society may ..be the most highly specialized society ever: but
its educational system is unquestionably the least specialized, the most
universally standardized, that has ever existed. (27)
This was the process that, in Eugen Weber’s phrase, turned Peasants into Frenchmen
(Weber (1976)) and villagers into citizens around the world wherever nationalism took
hold. In many cases, far from being the expression of a unified culture, states preceded
3

the emergence of a nation. Taparelli D'Azeglio (1867) had served as prime minister of
Piedmont; writing about his country’s unification he observed “Italy has been made
Italy, but not the Italians.”
The absorption of local agrarian idioms and symbols into a standardized national
culture would have been resisted more forcefully had it not provided important benefits
for those making the transformation Though Gellner did not stress this, exo-education
in a common language and culture is a form of risk reduction, for it gives the exoeducated individual general skills that may be deployed in a variety of pursuits rather
than the occupation- or sector-specific skills that were passed on by parents engaged in
the forms of endo-education typical of agrarian societies.3
To see this suppose that uncertainty takes the form of the occurrence of either a
status quo state, in which the individual continues his current livelihood with income
y, or a bad state in which there is no demand for individual’s particular line of work, and
he is thus must pursue some other livelihood in which he receives y(1-s) where s is a
measure of the degree to which his skills are specific to the initial livelihood. Suppose
the status quo occurs with probability p > ½.. The individual’s expected income is
(1)

E(y) = py + (1-p)y(1-s)

and the variance of his realized income is p(1-p)(ys)2.
The structural and technical dynamism of capitalism arguably lowered the
probability of the status quo, but exo-education also lowered s. Because of cultural
homogenization coupled with the spread of mass exo-education, investments in human
capital became more general and (in bad states) more easily deployed in alternative uses
In the process of creative destruction, successful creation was now greatly remunerated
while, at the same time, the costs of destruction and failure were substantially decreased
by the increased reversibility and liquidity of human skills.
If the emergence of mobility and markets required some minimum degree of
cultural homogenization, their development also implied a dramatic further increase in
cultural homogenization that, in most cases, caused a deepening of the feelings of
national solidarity. Cultural homogenization and solidarity within large well defined
territories are, thus, two complementary aspects of nationalism. At the same time, they
are also substitutes in the sense that they can acts as alternative insurance devices against
the risk associated to the specialization of skills in a volatile market society (D'Antoni
and Pagano (2002)).
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While the national state originated this self-reinforcing process, it could hardly
be contained forever within the boundaries of national states. Some national states
developed a sense of “global mission” and started doing to other languages and traditions
what the national state had done to the diverse cultures and dialects within its
boundaries. Included are Britain with its Commonwealth, the Russian Empire in its last
manifestation as the Soviet Union, and United States with its federal system, with its
frontier and with its melting pot of different ethnic groups.
In many cases, national states -- especially the non-English speaking ones now
find themselves in opposition to the further advancement of the very process of cultural
homogenization that a century earlier had been their main task and, perhaps, the
fundamental reason for their existence. The former cultural standardizers of the Age of
Nationalism have become the victims of standardization on an even grander scale, a
historical nemesis that threatens the survival of their own traditions. The energetic
defense of the French language and the ongoing battles within the World Trade
Organization about national subsidization of cultural production reflect this
development.
Cosmopolitans and Provincials
This is the sense in which we mean that globalism is the highest stage of
nationalism. But the emerging global world order marks a new age, as different from the
nationalisms with which now contends as from the ancient empires with which it is
inevitably compared.
It is different from the empires that had in the past politically unified large areas
of Europe, Northern India, and even China. The Roman Empire of antiquity and, after
that, the Holy Roman Empire never posed a comparable challenge to cultural diversity.
The universal culture and the lingua franca remained the distinctive mark of the ruling
classes. The same could be said with only slightly less force of the Mughal Empire. In
the ancient empires, a modicum of political unity was accomplished in the absence of
cultural unity. Globalization appears likely to do the opposite.
Modern globalization spreads global culture well beyond a ruling minority. But
while the economic integration and cultural standardization accomplished by
globalization may favor greater political integration, political unity today is mainly
based on the dominance of United States, on local process of political integration such
as the European Community, and on the limited governance of some international
institutions.
In addition to its lack of well defined boundaries, the nature of modern globalism
is also fundamentally different from nationalism. The political unity of the national state
made possible a distinctive method of risk reduction: cultural homogenization and social
5

protection combined to reduce the risks associated with the market economy. Tax and
transfer policies that redistributed income from the lucky to the unlucky decreased risk
exposure, while those workers who had acquired job-specific skills were buffered from
the vagaries of the labor market by employment safeguards and unemployment
insurance. The willingness of the lucky pay to insure the unlucky even after the dice had
been rolled was enhanced by the feeling that “it could have been me,” itself a product of
cultural homogenization.
Modern globalism not only lacks the international institutions allowing social
protection on a world scale, it also makes the traditional forms of social protection
offered by the national state increasingly problematic. The increased mobility of capital
and other factors of production owned by the relatively well off has provided a rationale
for shifting taxation away from these factors, thus raising the cost of policies designed
to redistribute income within the nation state.4 Increasingly competitive goods markets,
along with greater mobility of capital and professional labor has also reduced the scope
for trade union bargaining (Choi (2004)) and in some countries weakened job protection.
Moreover, cultural standardization-- the other instrument by which national
economies have traditionally insured their citizens against the risks of market mobility -is very limited in the internationally integrated economy. Access to the dominant cultural
standard – English fluency -- is much more unequally distributed on a world scale that
the national equivalents within national boundaries – fluency in the national language.
The result is a division between those endowed with mobile intellectual assets that are
easily redeployed throughout the global economy – the cosmopolitans – and those that
have skills that are less mobile and more specific to the national economy -- the
provincials. The distinction, roughly, that is between the skills typical of people working
in Silicon Valley and Detroit, or Bangalore and Kanpur.
Cosmopolitians -- even those with modest incomes -- may prefer to replace social
protection with cultural standardization as their preferred form of insurance, withdrawing
where possible from the mutual insurance system that characterizes national states. Like
financial capital, these workers may become difficult to tax. Their relatively easy exit
from a national system of mutual insurance makes it even more difficult to finance the
traditional forms of social protection supplied by the national state and worsens the
situation of those workers who lack access to the global cultural standard.
The partial cultural standardization associated with modern globalism may thus
create a world cosmopolitan elite communicating amongst themselves in a new Latin
that cannot be used as a working language by the vast majority of the populations among
4
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whom they live. The result would be an information-age equivalent to the old agrarian
societies studied by Gellner, presided over by an elite whose high culture unites them
around the globe as it separates them from the rest of their own societies, who are in turn
separated one from another by the persistence of linguistic and cultural divisions. The
fact that many workers of modest incomes will count themselves among the
cosmopolitans differentiates modern globalism from the ancient agrarian societies and
empires. But, as we will se, this may also exacerbate the challenge facing the nationally
based welfare state.
The Politics of Insurance
To show this, we will model the social insurance preferences of a citizenry of
identical decreasingly risk averse individuals. Preferences among citizens are identical
but, due to differences in the nature of their income earning assets, they differ in
expected income and risk exposure.5 If an individual’s utility as a function of her income
is U= U(y) then the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is = -U” U’. If the utility
function is less concave at higher levels of income, or d /dy < 0, then decreasing risk
aversion is said to obtain, meaning that the rich are less risk averse than the poor.6
While the concavity of the utility function undoubtedly captures important
aspects of behavior in the face of risk, it certainly misses important influences such as
aversion to uncertainty, ambiguity, and fear of the unknown. We therefore use a
framework in which the concavity of the utility function as but one of many reasons a
citizen may wish to avoid risk. The approach captures the Arrow-Pratt logic under
appropriate conditions, but is not restricted to it. The basic idea is that expected income
as a “good” and the variance of income as a “bad.” Social insurance is a way of reducing
one’s exposure to the bad by trading away some of the good.
Suppose the income y of an individual with a given set of assets income varies
in response to stochastic shocks according to
(2)

y=z +g
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We are here following the work of Sinn (1995) and Domar and Musgrave
(1944)) who modeled the welfare state as a process of redistribution from the lucky to
the unlucky rather than from the rich to the poor. Our model is an adaptation of
D'Antoni and Pagano (2002). Contrary to compelling evidence of widespread fairmindedness and concern for the less well off even among higher income earners
(e.g.Fong (2001)), we assume that our citizens are entirely self regarding.
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Evidence that risk aversion is decreasing in income is presented in Saha,
Shumway, and Talpaz (1994)
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where g is expected income and z is a random variable with mean zero and unit standard
deviation. Thus, is the standard deviation of income, a measure of risk. Then we write
the individual’s utility function as


(3)

v = v{g, }


With suitable restrictions on its partial derivatives, this function expresses the
individual’s positive valuation of higher levels of expected income (vg > 0) and negative
valuation of more uncertain income (v < 0), without implying that the latter is due to the
concavity of the function U(y). Because of the particular way we have introduced risk,
however, this function is also able to capture the logic of the Arrow-Pratt measure.7
The indifference loci representing an individual with decreasing risk aversion

Figure 1. Indifference loci of a decreasingly
risk averse citizenry with a taxonomy of
citizens according to their assets and
associated expected income and risk
exposure.
7

The general utility function U(y) can be expressed as a simple two-parameter
utility function in this case because the variation in income is generated by what is
termed a linear class of disturbances. The technical details are in Bardhan, Bowles, and
Gintis (2000), drawing on the earlier work of Meyer (1987) and Sinn (1990).
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appear in Figure 1.
They are increasing and convex in , flat at the vertical intercept
(v = 0 for = 0), become flatter for increasing g when > 0 and become steeper for
increasing . The slope of an indifference locus, -v /vg,
(g, ), is the marginal rate of
substitution between risk and expected income. Thus (g, ) is a measure of the level of
risk aversion experienced by an individual faced with a given level of expected income
and risk. It is clear that this measure of risk aversion is increasing in the level of risk
exposure (movements to the right in Figure 1) and decreasing in the level of expected
income (movements upwards in Figure 1).












Figure 1 also indicates the { ,g} pairs associated with four classes of citizens
demarcated by their income levels and risk exposure.


Now suppose the citizens may tax themselves at a rate t, paying to each citizen
an equal share of the proceeds of the tax, tyo(1-w), where yo is mean income and w is
the proportional loss in distributed benefits due to administration, deadweight losses,
capital flight or other costs of operating the system. The citizen’s post-tax and transfer
expected income is now:
gt = g(1-t) + tyo(1-w)

(4)

and its standard deviation,

t


, is (1-t).


Varying t affects both expected income and the standard deviation of income.
The effect on expected income (differentiating (4) with respect to t) is -{g - yo(1-w)} and
the effect of variations in t the standard deviation of income is - . Thus for >0 this
“insurance technology” implies a “price of insurance,” , namely the loss in expected
income associated with a reduction in risk exposure, or what may be termed the marginal
rate of transformation of expected income into risk reduction. This price is just the ratio
of the two effects of varying t so






(5)


= {g - yo(1-w)}



If she could unilaterally determine the tax rate, the citizen whose expected income is less
than yo(1-w) could “purchase” insurance at negative cost (i.e. < 0), benefitting from
both the risk reduction and the fact that her transfer will exceed her tax payment. The
price of insurance is increasing in expected income and declining in risk exposure, as
one would expect.


What tax and transfer level would citizens prefer, if they were in position to
determine t? A citizens with g > yo(1-w) would maximize expected after-tax and
transfer utility, vt = v{gt (t), t (t)} by selecting the value of t that equates the price of
insurance (the marginal rate of transformation of expected income into risk reduction)
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to the marginal rate of substitution between risk and expected income, i.e.
figure 2 this optimum is point a for a person whose assets placed her at a’.


= . In

A person whose assets placed him at point f, better off than at point a’ and no
more risk exposed, would prefer a tax rate of zero (if he could, he would happily run the
tax system in reverse, setting t<0 and with all citizens paying a given lump sum in return
for a linear subsidy of their earnings, but we will not consider this case). Thus, we can
divide the citizenry into two classes: those whose asset position yields a positive optimal
tax rate, and those who would prefer no social insurance.
We know that an individual with no risk exposure ( = 0) and g = yo(1-w) will
be indifferent to the choice of t, for it will affect neither his risk exposure nor his
expected income. Now consider a person for whom g exceeds yo(1-w) by a small
amount. If the person is not risk- exposed, he will oppose social insurance; but there will
be some level of risk exposure that will make him indifferent between no tax and a
positive tax rate, namely that for which = . The (g, ) pairs for which = form the
zero tax locus in figure 3. Those whose assets place them above the zero tax locus will
oppose social insurance, while those below it will support some level of taxation.






Figure 2. A citizen’s optimal level of insurance.
The person with assets which the absence of
insurance would yield the outcome at a’ prefers to
purchase insurance at the price indicated by the
slope of the “insurance technology” locus, tt.
10



This view of voter preferences receives support from a study by Iversen and
Soskice (2001). They estimated the relationship between support for redistributive
measures and the degree of specificity of an individual’s skills in two social survey data
sets in 11 advanced democracies in the late 1990s. Conditioned on other influences on
political preferences (income, sex, employment status, party affiliation, and age) the
degree of skill specificity is a highly significant determinant of support for redistributive
policies, equal in effect size to income (that is a standard deviation difference in skill
specificity is associated with a difference in redistributive preferences an equivalent in
size to a standardization deviation difference in income.)

Figure 3. Social insurance: Pro and con
Individuals whose assets place them at points a or
b favor zero social insurance. Individuals above
and to the left of a and b oppose social insurance.
The zero tax locus --the heavy dashed line -- is the
locus of all such points. Thus those above the zero
tax locus oppose social insurance; those below it
support it

11

Globalism vs the Welfare State?
Consider three effects of globalism. First, the costs of redistribution may
increase. In our model this is just an increase in w, which (from (5)) has the effect of
raising the price of insurance, increasing the slope of the tt locus in figure 2 and thereby
shifting the zero tax locus downwards. As a result more citizens are included in the con
rather than the pro classes.
Second, if economic integration raises incomes (as one may expect it to do on
average), it will move citizens upwards in figure 3, leading to reduced support of the
welfare state.
Third, globalism may alter the distribution of citizens in {g, } space. Rodrik
(1998), Garrett (1998) and others have suggested that openness may increase support for
the welfare state by increasing risk exposure (shifting voters to the right in figure 3.)
These effects appear to have been at work in a number of countries, including those that
pioneered the institutions that we now call the welfare state (Moene and Wallerstein
(1995).8


While we believe these effects to be operative in many cases, we have above
stressed another possible shift in the distribution of citizens: the emergence of a large
class of cosmopolitans, including many with middling incomes. To dramatize the
importance of this shift (through a bit of exaggeration), consider a “prototype 19th
century economy”. It is composed of what Alchian and Demsetz (1972) called “classical
capitalist firms” whose single owner hires (in a daily spot market) workers with few
firm-specific skills (what Marx termed abstract labor). An owner of tangible assets in
such a firm is highly risk exposed, as there is a substantial loss in the value of an asset
once it is the installed – in the modern economy typically well over half of the initial
cost (Asplund (2000)). By contrast, the workers’ job assets – abstract labor – make
them much less risk exposed. In this world, the owners would be classed among the high
income provincials in figure 1, while the workers would be the low income
cosmopolitans: the distribution of citizens would lie in the “north east” and “south west”
quadrants. Of course most workers’ expected incomes would be such that g < yo(1-w),
so most workers and all but the very rich owners would support the welfare state.
This economy is imaginary, but the contrast between it and what may be the
emerging global order is striking. Workers now receive substantial job rents, that is, pay
above their next best alternative. These are the result either of workers’ firm-specific
skills, or of the widespread use by employers of contingent renewal strategies of labor
8

The study by Iversen and Cusack (2000) of the sources of welfare state
expansion in the advanced countries finds that technology shocks and structural
transformations of the economy unrelated to globalization have larger effects.
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discipline that result in equilibrium wages in excess of workers’ reservation wages. And
while industrial assets are still highly specific, many of the assets used in the sales and
service sectors of the economy (far larger than manufacturing in most advanced
economies) are quite general (buildings and computers, for example). Moreover, in
contrast to the fictive classical capitalist firm, ownership of these assets is highly
diversified. Both diversification and the more general nature of these assets have the
effect of greatly reducing risk exposure. Additionally, there is now a large class of
salaried employees whose high level of general skills, including their access to the global
cultural standard, greatly reduces their risk exposure. These are the new cosmopolitans.

Figure 4. Changing distribution of citizens and
zero tax locus under the influence of
globalization. The dashed contours give the
distribution of voters. The dashed zero tax locus
shows the effect of the increased price of insurance.
Figure 4 illustrates these shifts. The inner dashed contour indicates a greater
density of citizens, and the increasingly “north-west, south-east” array of citizens
suggests a new dimension of support and opposition for social insurance, namely the
degree access to the global cultural standard. One cannot rule out a “twin peaks”
distribution emerging, with a concentration of well-to-do cosmopolitans and less well
off provincials divided by a ravine of cultural disparity and divergent economic
opportunity. To avoid unnecessary simplification, we have deliberately not specified
13

how the national tax rate will be selected. So one cannot predict the effect on the amount
of support for social insurance in general.
This is especially the case because the process of economic integration is also
one of specialization, the effect of which is that countries will become more distinct in
the kinds of skills and other assets that their product mix requires. Suppose there are two
goods, grain and plows, and that in the absence of international exchange each of two
countries would employ equal numbers of worker-citizens producing the two goods.
The demand for plows, as an investment good, is highly volatile (it is proportional to the
change in the level of demand for grain), while the demand for grain, a consumption
good, is less volatile, depending on the level of income and population. Except for the
very well paid, those employed producing plows will be supporters of insurance, while
except for the poorest, those growing grain will oppose it. Many models of the process
electoral competition would predict that the resulting social policy would include some
but not very much social insurance.
Following economic integration, however, one country specializes in plow
production and the other in grain production. As a result, the voters in Ploughland are
now almost uniformly supporters of social insurance, while the citizens of Grainia are
equally opposed (unless, of course, openness has increased risk exposure in Grainia
sufficiently to offset the reduction in risk associated with specialization in the less
volatile good). The result is that economic integration may lead to greater institutional
diversity, rather than, as is sometimes predicted, institutional homogenization.
Only slightly less transparent is the case where sectors differ in the importance
of specific skills, and integration leads to some countries specializing in producing
general-skill goods and others in specific-skill goods. This view is advanced by Hall and
Soskice (2001):38. “...national institutional frameworks provide nations with
comparative advantage. In the presence of trade, these advantages should give rise to
...specialization.” In turn, according to Hall and Soskice, specialization in those goods
for which a country has a comparative advantage is likely to support institutional
divergence.
In theses cases, the specialization associated with integration may enhance the
diversity of ‘technology-institutional equilibria’(Pagano, Ugo (1993)). Hall and Soskice
have interpreted the differing social policies of the U.S. and Germany in this light, the
German product mix requiring high levels of specific skills, the protection of which
through generous unemployment benefits and other forms of job protection is supported
by large majorities of the public. The presence of these social protection policies, in turn,
allows these specific skill intensive industries to attract labor and remain viable in
international competition.

14

The presumption that globalism induces institutional convergence is based on
a simple, but wrong model. Global competition is represented as a kind of selection
pressure operating to force the elimination of inferior designs. But geography and
history combine to make specialization advantageous, and given that some institutions
are better able to coordinate the production of some goods, while other institutions do
better for other goods, the increase in selection pressure may produce divergence rather
than convergence (Pagano, Ugo (2001). It was economic integration – not autarky –
that induced the divergence in institutional structure between the sugar growing islands
of the Caribbean on the one hand, and those economies of Central America, such as
Costa Rica, whose geography is ill suited to plantation crops.9 Another example: the
importance of family owned firms in the Italian economy distinguishes it from most of
its competitors, and is in turn explained by the fact that due to economic integration, Italy
increasingly specializes in those goods for which this form of governance is effective.
To the extent that some policies of social insurance are indeed simply inferior
designs, while other nation’s lack of social insurance are also simply flawed designs,
globalism will increase the pressures for policy convergence. But one cannot say if these
forces will be offset by the persistence of distinct institutional arrangements associated
with high levels of specialization.
Optimal Specialization?
Investment in general rather than industry- or occupation-specific skills and
assets is a means of reducing risk exposure, and thus may be a substitute for the kinds
of social insurance modeled above. What may be termed a cosmopolitan risk reduction
strategy may become increasingly attractive in those countries in which economic
integration creates pressures to reduce the scope of social insurance and job protection.
But, unless emigration is a feasible option, even those with general assets are vulnerable
in an economy specialized in the production of a limited range of goods. This is because
the protection against adverse price shocks offered by general assets takes the form of
an ability to redeploy these skills in other industries or occupations for which the
relevant prices are substantially uncorrelated. The shock-induced relocation of inputs
from one industry to another will generate adverse price effects even when assets being
relocated are entirely general. But in an economy with a diverse “portfolio” of industries
and occupations, these effects will be small as long as the adversely affected sectors are
small relative to the size of the economy as a whole.

9

Ortiz (1963) describes the correspondence between the nature of agricultural
crops – tobacco and sugar – and the institutions governing their production in preRevolutionary Cuba.
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The existence of such a diverse “portfolio” of industries and occupations is,
however, a public good in the sense that it provides general risk-reduction benefits that
are not accounted for in the individual’s utility- or profit-maximizing choices concerning
occupational or sectoral location. For this reason economies guided entirely by private
incentives will tend to overspecialize. Global economic integration will exacerbate this
market failure if it increases risk exposure and reduces the scope of substitute forms of
risk reduction such as social insurance. (We have given reasons above to doubt that these
widely presumed effects of globalization will be uniformly experienced among nations.)
Conclusion
If we are correct, understanding the impact of globalism on national policies for
redistribution and social insurance would be enhanced by greater attention to the degree
of specificity of the assets held by people and to the possible emergence of a large class
of cosmopolitans with little interest in traditional social insurance policies and weak
solidarity with co-resident provincials. It would be valuable to know, as an empirical
matter, if among people with similar incomes those with more general education tend
to oppose social insurance. Equally important is the possible divergence of national
institutional trajectories as a consequence of more advanced levels of specialization
made possible by global integration. Are there empirical cases in which divergence in
social insurance policies can be plausibly linked to divergent patterns of specialization
following economic integration?
Our approach also suggests some interesting puzzles. Why, for example, are the
children of the relatively well off the cosmopolitans, while the children of less well off
tend to become provincials? Given the greater risk aversion of the latter group (parents
and children alike), one might have expected the reverse. Of course in most countries,
the types of education experienced by the two groups differ, with the cosmopolitans
more likely to gain a classical liberal arts education including languages, while the latter
acquire occupational skills. But there is a substantial element of choice involved in
implementing this difference. Are the general skills of the cosmopolitans complementary
with wealth, so that the asset poor benefit less from learning English, or programming
skills, for example, than the children of the well to do? Another intriguing puzzle would
be to understand one of the few effective political coalitions across the provincialcosmopolitan divide, namely the anti-globalization movement in Europe and North
America.
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